Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Provisional Orders in the United States: Toward a Practical Solution by Park, S. Nathan
999 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF  
FOREIGN PROVISIONAL ORDERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
TOWARD A PRACTICAL SOLUTION 
S. NATHAN PARK1
ABSTRACT 
 Currently, the United States law lacks a coherent mechanism 
for providing recognition to, and allowing enforcement of, provi-
sional orders issued by a foreign court.  This paper argues for es-
tablishing a system for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
provisional orders in the United States.  Such a system would con-
fer three main benefits:  (1) enhanced efficiency of transnational lit-
igation in the U.S. courts; (2) appropriate allocation of judicial re-
source between U.S. and foreign courts that would promote both 
constitutional rights and judicial efficiency, and; (3) creation of the 
U.S.-led ecosystem of private international law.  This paper then
examines the three possible paths of establishing the system of for-
eign provisional order recognition:  judicial, legislative, and treaty-
based.  Although all three paths are viable, this paper argues that
the treaty-based option provides the maximum flexibility neces-
sary to reap the triple benefits of having a legal mechanism for
recognition and enforcement of foreign provisional orders.
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1. INTRODUCTION:  PROVISIONAL ORDERS IN TRANSNATIONAL
SETTING 
As international interactions of the United States and U.S. na-
tionals increase, thousands of transnational litigation—lawsuits lit-
igated within the national court system but with elements that 
reach beyond the national borders—are filed with the U.S. courts 
every year.2  However, transnational litigation in the United States 
often suffers from the lack of one of the basic litigation devices:  
provisional relief.  Provisional reliefs, which maintain the status 
quo during the litigation, are particularly important in transna-
tional litigation, because it is much easier to frustrate the enforce-
ment of the court’s final judgment when the case crosses the na-
tional border.3  A non-U.S. litigant, who wishes to ensure that the 
final judgment of the case (pending before a non-U.S. court) is sat-
isfied, must often find herself in a situation in which she must pre-
serve the status quo in the United States—typically in the form of 
defendants’ asset located in the United States. 
Although it is theoretically possible to obtain a provisional re-
lief from a U.S. court to aid the main proceedings in a foreign coun-
try, such course of action is fraught with uncertainty and delay, 
which allow the defendant to upset the status quo yet again while 
the petition for a provisional relief is pending before the U.S. 
court.4  In the flip-side situation, in which a foreign litigant at-
tempts to enforce a provisional order issued by a foreign court in 
the United States, the U.S. law provides virtually no guidance. 
U.S. law does have several small pockets in which a U.S. court 
would recognize and enforce a provisional order issued by a for-
2 See ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION 4 (2003) (“Quote simply, more international trade means more trans-
national disputes, contractual, quasi-contractual, and arising from the negligent 
provision of goods and services.”).  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts?  Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 441, 462 (2007) (finding that, based on the data collected by the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, well over 120,000 alienage cases (i.e. dis-
pute between citizens of a U.S. state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1332) terminated in the United States federal district courts 
between 1986 and 2005.  This figure does not include the transnational litigation 
that occurs at the state court level, which means the total volume of transnational 
litigation in American courts would be even higher). 
3 See discussion infra at Section 3.2. 
4 See discussion infra at Sections 2 and 3.1. 
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eign court.  In the areas of drug crimes or securities fraud, the 
United States is a party to bilateral and multilateral treaties that re-
quire the U.S. court to recognize and enforce foreign provisional 
orders.5  A scattershot of state courts have held that foreign provi-
sional orders, usually issued in the areas of matrimonial and family 
law, are entitled to recognition and enforcement in the United 
States.6  And the few federal courts that considered this issue have 
held that recognition of a foreign provisional order may be theoret-
ically possible, although they declined to actually recognize the 
foreign provisional order that appeared before them.7  Finally, Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws raises the possibility that 
the U.S. court may recognize and enforce foreign provisional or-
ders under certain circumstances.8  For this proposition, however, 
5 See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances art. 7, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Agreement Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Singapore Concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offences and the Sei-
zure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instruments of Drug Trafficking, U.S.-Sing., 
Nov. 3 2001, art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 13125; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Between the United States and Switzerland, U.S.-Switz., May 23, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 2019;  MOU Between the United States and Switzerland, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 
31, 1978, 43 SEC Docket 14; Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers’ Association with 
Regard to the Handling of Requests for Information from the SEC on the Subject 
of Misuse of Insider Information, U.S.-Switz., July 14, 1982, 43 SEC Docket 155; 
MOU on Exchange of Information Between the SEC and the UK Department of 
Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Securities and Between the US Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and the UK DTI in Matters Relating to Fu-
tures, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 23, 1986, 43 SEC Docket 176; Memorandum of the SEC and 
the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Infor-
mation, 43 SEC Docket 184 (May 23, 1986) (providing examples of such conven-
tions that the U.S. is a party to). 
6 See, e.g., Pacanins v. Pacanins, 650 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that a Venezuelan court order should be enforced in the U.S.).  See also 
Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 
2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Wolff v. Wolff, 389 A.2d 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1978); Yoder v. Yoder, 330 A.2d 825 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974) (providing more ex-
amples of various state courts recognizing foreign provisional orders). 
7 See, e.g., Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Indus., Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1039, 1043 
(D. Del. 1984); Air Prods. and  Chems., Inc. v. Inter-Chem., Ltd., 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49198, *18–21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2005) (providing examples of holdings that 
gave conditions under which an American court may recognize a foreign judge-
ment).  Compare Siko Ventures v. Argyll Equities LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21257 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 2005) (giving recognition to the final injunctive judgment ren-
dered by the Hong Kong court), with the foregoing. 
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, cmt. g (“It can . . . be 
assumed that a decree rendered in a foreign nation which orders or enjoins the 
doing of an act will be enforced in this country provided that such enforcement is 
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the Restatement only cites a single state court case from the late 
19th century, Roblin v. Long.9  The courts that did consider the Re-
statement’s position nonetheless refused to recognize foreign pro-
visional orders, noting the paucity of supporting authority in the 
Restatement.10 
Scholarly attention in this area of law has been likewise scant 
and scattered.  For the most part, U.S. legal scholars have consid-
ered foreign provisional orders in the context of certain specific ar-
eas of the law—such as arbitration or intellectual property—but 
rarely as a standalone category as a general feature of private in-
ternational law.11  The few articles that do discuss provisional or-
ders as an independent feature in transnational litigation are nearly 
twenty years old or older.12  Provisional orders are such a scholarly 
afterthought that the leading textbook in transnational litigation in 
the United States does not even have a chapter on provisional or-
ders.13 
necessary to effectuate the decree and will not impose an undue burden upon the 
American court.”). 
9 60 How. Pr. 200 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1880).   
10 See, e.g., Pilkington, 581 F.Supp. at 1043 n.6, and Air Prods., 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49198 at *19 n.7 (providing examples of cases that did not recognize foreign 
judgments). 
11 See, e.g., Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures for Protection; Security for 
Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (in Toto), 9 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155 (1998) (considering foreign provisional orders in the con-
text of intellectual property law); Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. 
Patent Cases and Their Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331 
(2009) (considering foreign provisional orders in the context of intellectual proper-
ty law); Panagiota Kelali, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation in the Internet 
Era:  What in the U.S. Best Interest?, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 263 
(2006) (considering foreign provisional orders in the context of international 
commerce); Michael D. Mann, Paul A. Leder and Elizabeth Jacobs, The Establish-
ment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final Judgments 
Arising from Securities Law Violations, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303 (1992) (consider-
ing foreign provisional orders in the context of securities law); William Wang, In-
ternational Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN 
J. INT’L L. 1059 (2003) (considering foreign provisional orders in the context of ar-
bitration).
12 See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 553, 556–57 (1997) (exemplifying an article from 1997 that 
discuses provisional orders as an independent feature of transnational litigation); 
David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim Relief Awarded by U.S. and German Courts 
in Support of Foreign Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723 (1990) (presenting 
“a thumbnail sketch of the law in the United States and Germany on the availabil-
ity of relief before judgment in support of foreign proceedings.”). 
13 Samuel P. Baumgartner, Book Review:  Transnational Litigation in the United 
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In assessing the state of the law, Professor George Bermann 
had commented in 1997 that the U.S. law on transnational provi-
sional order was “far less well defined” than nearly all other con-
ceivable topics in transnational litigation, including:  deference to 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts or an arbitration panel; service of 
process abroad; collecting evidence abroad; recognition and en-
forcement of foreign final judgments, and; international anti-suit 
injunction.14  The situation has not improved in the two decades 
since Professor Bermann had made that comment, as there has 
been virtually no scholarly interest—much less judicial interest—in 
addressing the issue of constructing a coherent, generally applica-
ble system of converting a provisional order obtained from a for-
eign court into an order that is enforceable in the United States.15 
This under-development is problematic.  In the subsequent 
parts, this paper will offer a more detailed analysis of why an ab-
sence of a general system for recognition and enforcement of for-
eign provisional orders presents a problem, and how the United 
States may construct such a system in a practical manner.  Specifi-
cally, Part 2 of this paper will present two hypothetical scenarios 
involving provisional orders in transnational litigation, in which 
injustice and inefficiency arise because the U.S. law lacks the sys-
tem for foreign provisional orders.  These scenarios are based on 
real world events in order to highlight the exigency of the problem 
of injustice and inefficiency, and the necessity for a practical solu-
tion. 
Part 3 will offer three principal benefits of formulating a coher-
ent system of recognizing and enforcing foreign provisional orders.  
First, such a system would enhance the efficacy of transnational lit-
igation, because provisional orders serve the crucial role of ensur-
ing that litigation victory is not rendered pyrrhic.  Such assurance 
States, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 797–98 (2007) (reviewing Gary Born and Peter B. 
Rutledge, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, 4th ed. 
(2007)). 
14 Bermann, supra note 12, at 556–57. 
15 Note, however, that from 1992 to 2002, the United States participated in 
the Hague Conference of Private International Law, which attempted to formulate 
a system that would have established a global system of enforcing provisional or-
der and final judgment, as well as harmonizing the competing jurisdictions of the 
party states.  However, the project was mostly focused on international jurisdic-
tion and recognition of final judgments, with provisional orders as an after-
thought.  Further, for several reasons to be discussed below, the project failed.  See 
discussion infra at Section 3.4. 
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is particularly necessary in the context of transnational litigation, in 
which the barriers between different judicial systems hamper the 
effective vindication of legal rights.  Second, having a coherent sys-
tem of recognizing foreign provisional orders will lead to efficient 
allocation of judicial resources and protection of U.S. interests, by 
addressing situations in which the U.S. courts are involved either 
too much (leading to duplicative litigation) or too little (leading to 
leaving U.S. interests subject to foreign court’s authority without 
U.S. court supervision.)  Third, building a mutually enforceable 
system of recognizing foreign provisional orders may serve as the 
first step toward creating a U.S.-led judicial ecosystem, which 
would provide leverage for the United States in the formation of 
private international law that the European Union has hereto dom-
inated.   
Taking these three reasons into account, Part 4 will propose 
three possible means of creating a system that provides for recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign provisional orders—judicial, leg-
islative, and treaty-based—and assess the strengths and weakness-
es of each.  This paper will argue that while any one of the three 
means can be used to create a system of foreign provisional order 
recognition, the treaty-based option is the most preferable one.  
Although the judicial path remains a possibility under the Su-
preme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot,16 it is doubtful that the U.S. 
courts will actually take that path, as U.S. courts traditionally have 
shown very little inclination to view transnational litigation as a 
standalone category that warrants systematic consideration for the 
treatment of foreign court orders.  The legislative path has a ready 
model for foreign provisional order in Uniform Foreign Money 
Judgment Recognition Act (“UFMJRA”), but the state-to-state vari-
ations in UFMJRA indicates that the legislative path is less than 
ideal for constructing a national system of recognizing foreign pro-
visional orders.  A treaty-based approach, in contrast, allows for a 
truly uniform treatment of foreign provisional orders throughout 
the United States.  Further, a treaty can fully address the foreign 
policy implications of an international provisional order recogni-
tion regime, with maximum flexibility that would lead to a practi-
cal solution. 
16 153 U.S. 113 (1895). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
1006 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
2. THE HARM OF LACKING A SYSTEM FOR RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROVISIONAL ORDER:  TWO SCENARIOS 
How does the absence in the United States law of the system 
that uniformly handles foreign provisional orders prejudice trans-
national litigants?  Consider the following two scenarios, based on 
real world examples: 
Scenario 1. 
Tycoon X, a Korean citizen who resides in Korea, is a wealthy 
businessman.  Tycoon X’s business began to falter with the eco-
nomic downturn, which caused Tycoon X to incur massive amount 
of debt.  Instead of paying the debt, Tycoon X simply disappears, 
presumably leaving Korea.  Creditors of Tycoon X—also Korean 
nationals who conduct business in Korea—sue Tycoon X in a Ko-
rean court.  The creditors then obtain a provisional attachment or-
der from the Korean court against Tycoon X’s property to secure 
the final judgment that the creditors are most likely to obtain even-
tually, given the certainty of debt and Tycoon X’s failure to contest 
the debt. 
As the creditors attempt to attach X’s assets, they find there is 
practically no property left in Korea to attach.  As it turns out, Ty-
coon X personally owned little property as a formal matter; in-
stead, various shell corporations located in the State of New York 
technically hold the bulk of Tycoon X’s wealth.  Tycoon X’s chil-
dren, who live in the State of New York as U.S. Permanent Resi-
dents (i.e. Green Card holders who retained their Korean citizen-
ship,) control and manage the shell corporations.  The creditors 
discover that, whenever Tycoon X earned money in Korea, he si-
phoned the money to the U.S. in a manner that was fraudulent to 
Tycoon X’s creditors.17   
Although the Korean creditors of Tycoon X already litigated 
the debt before the Korean court and obtained a provisional relief 
from the court, the provisional order issued by the Korean court 
faces a terribly uncertain prospect in New York, because there is no 
17 This example is loosely based on Korea Resolution and Collection Corpora-
tion v. Ahae Press, Inc. et al., Index No. 650349/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 
filed Feb. 6, 2015).  This author was the New York counsel for the plaintiff in the 
case. 
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reliable legal rule—be it a statute, the Restatement or a New York 
precedent—under which a New York court would give effect to 
the Korean court’s provisional order.  For the sake of greater legal 
certainty, the Korean creditors institute a new action in New York 
to reach Tycoon X’s property.18  This action, theoretically, should 
have the same result as the New York court’s recognition and en-
forcement of the Korean provisional relief.  But practical considera-
tions make a significant difference in reality:  the time the Korean 
creditors took to search for a New York counsel, and the time the 
counsel spent preparing for a new round of litigation in New York, 
furnish Tycoon X’s children with ample opportunity to divert the 
asset to yet another jurisdiction. 
Scenario 2. 
Hotelier Y, a U.S. citizen who resides in New York, is sued in 
the United Kingdom, whose courts have personal jurisdiction over 
her.  Based on the UK plaintiff’s petition claiming that Hotelier Y is 
attempting to frustrate the court’s judgment by hiding assets, the 
UK court issues a provisional Mareva order on an ex parte basis, 
which prohibits Hotelier Y from transferring or encumbering her 
assets in any way during the pendency of the litigation, on the pain 
of contempt.19   
Virtually all of Hotelier Y’s property is located in New York, in 
the form of her hotel, bank accounts, accounts payable owed to her 
by her business counterparties, and so on.  In an attempt to enforce 
the Mareva order, the UK plaintiff sends informal letters to Hotelier 
Y’s banks and business counterparties, who are third parties not 
subject to the UK court’s jurisdiction.  In the letter, the UK plaintiff 
demands that the third parties refrain from transferring any of Y’s 
assets in their possession.20   
18 See Barclays Bank, S.A. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802 (D.C. 1988) (providing an 
example of a U.S. court issuing a provisional order to assist a foreign proceeding). 
19 See Mareva Compania Naviera v. Int’l Bulkcarriers S.A. (The Mareva), 
[1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.) (explaining that Mareva is a court order, is-
sued before the final judgment, that preserves the assets of a defendant who may 
dispose of her assets so as to defeat the final judgment).  See Jeffery L. Wilson, 
Three if by Equity:  Mareva Orders & the New British Invasion, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 673 (2005) (discussing potential extraterritorial abuses of Mareva or-
ders). 
20 This example is loosely based on CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel, 
NV, [2003] 1 All E.R. 564 and CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 100 
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Although the third parties—i.e., Hotelier Y’s banks and busi-
ness counterparts—are technically under no obligation to comply 
with the UK plaintiff’s informal letter notifying the existence of the 
Mareva order (because the third parties are not subject to UK 
court’s jurisdiction), the third parties nonetheless comply with the 
letter to avoid what they see as an unnecessary legal battle.  As a 
result, Hotelier Y suddenly finds herself unable to withdraw funds 
from her bank accounts or conduct transactions with her business 
counterparties on credit, which puts her business in dire straits.  
Because the UK court issued the Mareva order on an ex parte basis, 
Hotelier Y’s assets are frozen without any notification to her, de-
priving her of the opportunity to contest the Mareva order in a 
hearing before her assets are frozen.  
3. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONSTRUCT A SYSTEM FOR
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROVISIONAL
ORDERS:  THREE BENEFITS 
3.1.   Foreign Provisional Order, Defined 
To define the term of art that is the heart of the discussion:  
what, precisely, is a “foreign provisional order”?  The term is di-
visible into two parts:  “foreign” and “provisional order.”21  For the 
purpose of this paper, the word “foreign” in “foreign provisional 
order” indicates that a foreign court issued the order.  That is to 
say:  this paper is not concerned with instances in which a U.S. 
court issues a provisional order in order to assist a foreign proceed-
N.Y.2d 215 (2003). 
21 Certain international treaties governing transnational litigation use “provi-
sional order” as a term of art.  See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Independ-
ent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, Art. 20, Dec. 11, 1997, 2169 
U.N.T.S. 163, 196, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%
202169/v2169.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL6G-PX7N] (listing circumstances under 
which the court may issue a provisional order).  This paper, however, gives its 
own definition of “provisional order” and does not strictly adhere to a pre-
existing, technical definition that may be embodied in an international treaty, 
statute or the like, although this paper’s definition of the term may be broadly 
consistent with pre-existing understandings of the nature of provisional orders. 
See discussion infra in this section. 
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ing.22  Indeed, this is the circumstance described in Scenario 1 
above, as the Korean plaintiffs are seeking a provisional order from 
New York state court to assist a proceeding before a Korean court.  
However, as Scenario 1 demonstrates, having the U.S. court issue a 
provisional order to assist foreign litigation invites duplicative liti-
gation, and gives the defendant the time to frustrate the judg-
ment.23  Instead, this paper considers the system in which the liti-
gant first obtains a provisional order from a foreign court, and a 
U.S. court would domesticate the foreign provisional order by 
providing a summary procedure for recognition and enforce-
ment.24 
The term “provisional order” in “foreign provisional order,” 
for the purpose of this paper, indicates all interim reliefs that a 
court may grant prior to the final judgment.  This definition is pur-
posefully inclusive such that it does not necessarily depend on the 
technical categorization that a foreign legal system may make con-
cerning a particular type of interim relief.  For example, there is 
considerable debate as to how one may classify a Mareva order, 
which is a feature in many Common Law jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.25  As discussed above, 
Mareva order is a court order, issued before the final judgment, 
which preserves the assets of a defendant who may dispose of her 
assets so as to defeat the final judgment.  The courts that utilize 
Mareva orders have generally characterized the order as a judg-
22 See Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802 (holding that jurisdiction exists, noting the possi-
bility of staying the action pending completion of litigation in Europe, reversing 
the dismissal and remanding for further consideration). 
23 For further discussion regarding the disadvantage of a U.S. court issuing 
provisional relief to assist a foreign proceeding, see discussion infra at Section 3.3. 
24 As discussed further below, this proposed system is akin to U.S. law’s 
treatment of foreign final judgments.  See discussion infra at Section 4.2. For an ex-
ample of a statute providing for summary recognition of foreign money judg-
ments, see, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301–09 (McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New 
York Annotated) (providing statutory recognition of foreign country monetary 
judgments in New York). 
25 See David L. Zicherman, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary 
Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings:  A Comparative Anal-
ysis of the British and American Approaches, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 667, 674 (1989) (col-
lecting different characterizations of a Mareva order).  Although the United States 
is a Common Law jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a 
Mareva order is not available under the U.S. law.  See Grupo Mexicano de Desar-
rollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 
527 U.S. 308, 327–28 (1999) (“the relief sought by respondents does not have a ba-
sis in the traditional powers of equity courts”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
1010 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
ment, rather than an interim relief.  In the case of Mareva Compania 
Naviera v. Int’l Bulkcarriers S.A. (The Mareva), Lord Denning consid-
ered a Mareva order to be an “interlocutory judgment.”26  Subse-
quent English cases have held that a Mareva order is not a provi-
sional relief, on a rather technical basis that it is an in personam 
injunction that commands the defendant as to what she may do 
with her assets, rather than an order that authorizes the seizure of 
the asset.27  Similarly, the High Court of Australia has held that a 
Mareva order should not be considered under the law of injunc-
tions, instead characterizing it as “asset preservation orders.”28  Yet 
legal scholars have noted that the essential function of a Mareva or-
der is provisional, in that a Mareva order only serves to assist the 
plaintiff in her prosecution of a different litigation (the “main liti-
gation”) without affecting the decisions on the merits of that litiga-
tion.29 
For the purpose of this paper, the characterization by a foreign 
legal system need not be determinative.  In the spirit of pragma-
tism, this paper eschews navigating the thicket of whether a for-
eign legal system considers a particular pre-judgment relief a 
“provisional relief” under its system of the law.  Instead, this paper 
26 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA, [1980] 1 All 
E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.). 
27 See Cretanor Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Irish Marine Mgmt. Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 
966, 974 (Eng. C.A.) (“A Mareva injunction . . . is relief in personam.  It does not ef-
fect a seizure of any asset.  It merely restrains the owner from dealing with the as-
set in certain ways.”); Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A., 
[1981] Q.B. 65, 72, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 488 (1979) (Eng. Q.B.) (“the point of the Mareva 
jurisdiction is to proceed by stealth, to pre-empt any action by the defendant to 
remove his assets from the jurisdiction.  To achieve that result the injunction must 
be in a wide form because, for example, a transfer by the defendant to a collabora-
tor in the jurisdiction could lead to the transfer of the assets abroad by that collab-
orator.  But it does not follow that, having established the injunction, the court 
should not thereafter permit a qualification to it to allow a transfer of assets by the 
defendant if the defendant satisfies the court that he requires the money for a 
purpose which does not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdic-
tion.”). 
28 Cardile v. LED Builders Pty Ltd., [1999] 198 C.L.R. 380, 393 (Austl.). 
29 See Michael Tillbury, Remedy Discussion Forum:  Teaching Remedies in Aus-
tralia, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 589, 590 (2001) (as “a Mareva assists a right which may be 
established in the case,” a Mareva order is “part of the armour of prejudgment en-
forcement of remedies”); Lars E. Johansson, The Mareva Injunction:  A Remedy in 
the Pursuit of an Errant Defendant, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1103–04 (1998) (dis-
cussing Mareva order’s function as a prejudgment attachment); Peter S. O’Driscoll, 
Performance Bonds, Banker’s Guarantees, and the Mareva Injunction, 7 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 380, 398 (1985) (same). 
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opts for a functional definition:  any interim remedy, issued in or-
der to preserve the status quo or to secure assets out of which an 
ultimate judgment may be satisfied, either during the pendency of 
litigation or shortly before litigation begins, is considered a “provi-
sional order” in this paper.30  This functional definition has the ad-
vantage of flexibility, such that the definition accommodates the 
real-world context in which provisional reliefs appear in modern 
transnational litigation.  That is to say, regardless of the precise it-
eration that a provisional relief may take (for example, a provision-
al order may be applied in personam or in rem,) the purpose of the 
provisional order is invariably to control the defendant’s behavior 
and preserve the status quo in some way.31 
In addition to its practical advantage, this definition is con-
sistent with the manner in which the existing private international 
law scholarship understands the nature of provisional orders, alt-
hough the precise terms of art and the context in which they ap-
pear may differ.  For example, International Law Association de-
fines a “provisional order” as interim measures that “perform two 
principal purposes in in civil and commercial litigation:  (a) main-
tain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or 
(b) to secure assets out of which an ultimate judgment may be sat-
isfied.”32  This paper’s definition of “provisional order” is also sim-
ilar to the definition of “interim measures” in UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which defines “in-
terim measures” as
any temporary measure . . . , by which, at any time prior to 
the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally 
decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to:  (a) maintain 
or restore the status quo pending determination of the dis-
pute; (b) take action that would prevent, or refrain from 
taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent 
harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; (c) provide a 
means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent 
30 For discussion regarding the essential character that all types of provision-
al orders commonly share, see infra at Section 3.3.     
31 For examples of an in personam remedy used interchangeably with an in 
rem remedy to achieve the same result of preventing asset dissipation by the de-
fendant, see Wilson, supra note 19. 
32 Friedrich K. Juenger, The ILA Principles on Provisional and Protective 
Measures, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 942, 942 (1997). 
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award may be satisfied; or (d) preserve evidence that may 
be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.33   
In transnational litigation, provisional orders may take a num-
ber of different forms, including but not limited to:  attachment of 
defendant’s assets to secure the final judgment;34 protection of the 
subject matter of the dispute;35 preservation of evidence;36 anti-suit 
injunction,37 and so on.  From a global perspective, each form of 
provisional order in each legal system may differ from another 
provisional order in another legal system in any number of ways, 
including:  bases of jurisdiction (e.g., in rem versus in personam); in-
tra- versus extra-territorial reach (e.g., attachment of a fixed piece 
of real property versus a global Mareva order); severity of the rem-
edy (e.g., holding funds for several days versus raiding a place of 
business for evidence); level of continuing court supervision (e.g., 
33 Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985:  With Amendments as Adopted in 2006, at Ch. IV, 
Section 1, U.N. Pub. E.08.V4 (2008), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN6K-CSUX]. 
34 See, e.g., Federal Court Rule 2011 (Cth) pt 7.32 (Austl.); Civil Procedure 
Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, Part 25.1, ¶¶ 1(l) & (m) (Eng.); CODE DE PROCEDURE 
CIVILE [C. civ.] art. 515 (Fr.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG[ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE], Jan 30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBLL] 83, as amended, § 917, para. 
1 (Ger.); MINJI HOZEN-HO [CIVIL PROVISIONAL REMEDIES LAW] 1989, art. 20 (Japan); 
Minsa jiphaeng beob [Civil Procedure], Act. No. 10629, May 19, 2011, art. 277-jo (S. 
Kor.). 
35 See, e.g., Federal Court Rule 2011 (Cth) pt 7.33 (Austl.); Civil Procedure 
Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, Part 25.1, ¶¶ 1(c)(i)–(iii) & (e) (Eng.); CODE DE 
PROCEDURE CIVILE [C. civ.] art. 849 (Fr.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG[ZPO] [CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan 30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBLL] 83, as amended, § 942, 
para. 1 (Ger.); MINJI HOZEN-HO [CIVIL PROVISIONAL REMEDIES LAW] 1989, arts. 23–24, 
53–55, 58-65 (Japan); Minsa jiphaeng beob [Civil Procedure], Act. No. 10629, May 
19, 2011, art. 300-jo (S. Kor.). 
36 See, e.g., Federal Court Rule 2011 (Cth) pt 7.32 (Austl.); Civil Procedure 
Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, Part 25.1, ¶¶ 1(d) & (h)–(j) (Eng.); CODE DE PROCEDURE 
CIVILE [C. civ.] art. 134 (Fr.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG[ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE], Jan 30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBLL] 8, as amended, § 372 (Ger.); 
MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO][C. CIV. PRO.] 1996. art. 234 (Japan); Minsa sosong beob 
[Civil Procedure], Act. No. 10629, May 19, 2011, art. 379-jo (S. Kor.). 
37 See, e.g., CSR Am. Inc. v. Cigna Ins. Australia Ltd. [1997] 146 ALR 402 (Austl.) 
(discussing principles governing grant of interlocutory anti-suit injunctions re-
straining proceedings in foreign courts); Amchem Prods. Ltd. v. British Columbia 
(Workers’ Compensation Bd.), [1993] 1 SCR. 897 (Can.) (same); Societe Nationale In-
dustrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 AC 871 (P.C.) (Eng.) (same).  An anti-
suit injunction would fall under this paper’s expansive definition of “provisional 
order,” although an anti-suit injunction essentially deals with matters of jurisdic-
tion, especially in the transnational context.  See discussion infra at Section 4.3. 
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one-time halt of asset disposition versus receivership of a corpora-
tion,) and so on.  But two commonalities thread this wide-ranging 
diversity of provisional orders across the world:  (1) all provisional 
orders attempt to preserve the status quo in some manner while 
the main action is pending; and (2) virtually all modern legal sys-
tems have some form of the reliefs described in the foregoing, 
whether or not such legal systems technically categorize them as 
“provisional orders.”  These two commonalities allow for the crea-
tion of a system of recognition and enforcement of foreign provi-
sional orders. 
By constructing a general system of recognizing and enforcing 
foreign provisional orders, the United States stands to benefit in 
three major ways:  (1) enhance the effectiveness of transnational lit-
igation; (2) promote efficient allocation judicial resources, and; (3) 
take the first step toward creating a U.S.-led ecosystem of private 
international law in this area. 
3.2.   Enhancing the Effectiveness of Transnational Litigation 
As discussed above, provisional orders come in many different 
forms before and during the pendency of litigation.  Yet all provi-
sional orders share a common goal:  enhancing the efficacy of liti-
gation.  Securing the satisfaction of the forthcoming judgment, pro-
tecting the subject of the litigation while litigation is ongoing, 
searching the premises to preserve the evidence that may be de-
stroyed—assuming the plaintiffs’ contentions are meritorious, all 
of the foregoing measures are necessary to ensure that the lawsuit 
can practically deliver the desired end result by preserving the sta-
tus quo or status ex ante while the litigation is pending.38   
This necessity is particularly acute in contemporary transna-
tional litigation.39  There is a good reason why the first impulse of a 
person who wishes to run from the law is to flee the country.  
Thanks to ever-increasing international commerce and advance-
ments in technology, it takes mere seconds to move money across 
38 See Bermann, supra note 12, at 559 (“a broader purpose of provisional or-
ders” is to “help preserve the status quo pending litigation.”). 
39 See Westin & Chrocziel, supra note 12, at 723 (“parties embarking on litiga-
tion with foreign parties must often [fear] that, unless restrained, their adversaries 
will take actions that will make ultimate victory pyrrhic.”). 
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the border, and mere hours to move a person.  The same cannot be 
said about the legal process, although the legal process is tasked 
with regulating the movement of assets and people in order to 
vindicate legal rights.  Because court orders do not travel as quick-
ly and seamlessly as money and people do, “[t]he fact that one par-
ty may have a weak link with the country of the forum . . . tends to 
increase the pressure to settle or quit,” as Professor Gerry Maher 
noted.40  Accordingly, Maher notes that “in international litigation 
the place of provisional remedies may well be even more signifi-
cant” compared to domestic litigation.41  This is particularly true 
when the subject of the litigation is an especially modern and 
ephemeral one, such as intellectual property.  Because it is so easy 
to place evidence of intellectual property infringement beyond the 
reach of the plaintiff, and the effect of the infringement difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms, “quickly obtained injunctions and 
other relief orders are often the only real remedy.”42 
Because the United States law has no general system of ad-
dressing foreign provisional orders, litigants who obtained an in-
terim relief from a foreign court lack these critical protections af-
forded by provisional remedies.  This leads to instances of obvious 
injustice.  Scenario 1, discussed above, is an illustration of such an 
instance.  In Scenario 1, the Korean creditors of Tycoon X already 
have a provisional attachment order from the Korean court, but 
that order is useless in Korea as a practical matter (because there is 
no asset in Korea,) and useless in the U.S. as a legal matter (because 
it is highly unlikely that a U.S. court will recognize and enforce the 
order.)  For any chance at having their loans repaid, the creditors 
most likely have to institute an entirely new action before the New 
40 Gerry Maher & Barry J. Rodger, Provisional and Protective Remedies: the Brit-
ish Experience of the Brussels Convention, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 302, 303 (1999). 
41 Id.  
42 Horning, supra note 11, at 155–56. See also David Capper, The Need for Ma-
reva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2179 (2005) (“the United 
States very likely experiences the same problems that led eminent jurists around 
the world to fashion a remedy to protect litigants from unsatisfied judgments and 
courts from having their process stultified.  . . .  If the United States declined to 
recognize the Mareva injunction there may be a risk that it becomes a haven for 
persons determined to evade their legal responsibilities to deposit their assets.”).  
For additional discussion on the particular importance of provisional orders in 
transnational litigation in the context of the use of the Internet, see Kelali, supra 
note 11. 
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York court, which has jurisdiction over the fraudulently trans-
ferred property.  Meanwhile, the children of Tycoon X are free to 
upset the status quo by transferring the property to yet another ju-
risdiction, rendering satisfaction of Tycoon X’s debt impossible as a 
practical matter. 
It may be argued that expanding the availability of provisional 
reliefs should be approached with caution.  This argument has 
some force as a general matter, because the ease with which the pe-
titioner may obtain a provisional order inevitably affects the bal-
ance of power between the plaintiff and the defendant.  Plainly, a 
provisional order restricting the defendant’s activities (including 
disposition of defendant’s property) provides a great deal of prac-
tical leverage to the plaintiff.  For example, if the plaintiff manages 
to freeze the defendant’s assets before the litigation commences, 
the plaintiff may gain a significant advantage by putting the de-
fendant into a financial straitjacket.  This may lead to an intense 
settlement pressure, under which the defendant may be forced into 
a settlement without regard to the actual merits of the case.  This 
re-calibration of relative power balance between plaintiffs and de-
fendants has a significant impact in creditor-debtor relationship, as 
creditors generally rely on the courts to obtain satisfaction of un-
paid debts.  Writ large, the shifting power balance between plain-
tiffs and defendants (who are usually creditors and debtors respec-
tively,) caused by greater availability of provisional measures, may 
evolve into a political issue.  Indeed, debtors have always been an 
important constituency in American law and politics.43  Partially 
because the English bankruptcy law that early American colonial-
ists had left behind was so draconian, the United States law has 
been consistently friendly to the debtor to a point that it is accused 
of coddling debtors.44   
But in the context of transnational litigation, this concern is 
overstated.  As a threshold matter, any system under which the 
United States judiciary recognizes and enforces a foreign provi-
sional order would come with defenses against such recognition 
and enforcement, as per the requirement of the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution.45  Further, compared to her coun-
43 See generally Charles E. Dorkey III, ‘Grupo Mexicano’ N.Y.L.J. June 8, 2000. 
44 See id. 
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Sniadach v. Family 
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (“prejudgment garnishment of wages procedure, 
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terpart in domestic litigation, the plaintiff in transnational litiga-
tion—like the Korean creditors in Scenario 1—can exert little lever-
age through a provisional relief in the United States, precisely be-
cause there is no mechanism for obtaining one that is practically 
useful.  Even the most debtor-friendly jurisdiction, such as the 
United States, would not countenance a situation in which the 
creditor has no recourse through a provisional relief against a 
debtor who is determined to evade his debt—a frequent occurrence 
in the context of transnational litigation.46  Stated differently, estab-
lishing a system of recognizing foreign provisional orders does not 
grant any special power to a transnational plaintiff that is above 
and beyond what is commonly available in the domestic setting. 
At most, such a system would shore up the efficacy of transnation-
al litigation to be on the same level as domestic litigation.  Consid-
ering the critical importance that provisional reliefs play in trans-
national litigation, such shoring up is long overdue.  In the interest 
of justice, there needs to be a system through which a foreign pro-
visional order may be domesticated for enforcement in the United 
States. 
3.3.   Efficient, and Appropriate, Allocation of Judicial Resources 
The second benefit of recognizing foreign provisional orders is 
that it leads to efficient and appropriate allocation of foreign and 
domestic judicial resources.  Through the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, the U.S. law has expressed its desire to ensure appro-
                                                                                                                                   
with its obvious taking of property without notice and prior hearing, violates the 
fundamental principles of procedural due process” . . . “the wage earner [would 
be] deprived of his enjoyment of earned wages without any opportunity to be 
heard and to tender any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.”).  
For comparison, most U.S. laws providing for recognition and enforcement of for-
eign court’s final judgment in the United States have a set of defenses to which the 
party resisting recognition and enforcement may resort. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
5304 (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated) (providing 
grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgement).  For additional discussion on 
potential defenses against recognition and enforcement of foreign provisional or-
ders, see discussion infra at Section 4. 
46 Indeed, the U.S. law does allow a creditor to rely on a provisional relief to 
ensure that defendant satisfies the final judgment that the court would render 
eventually.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 (authorizing seizure of a person or property 
to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment).   
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priate allocation of judicial responsibility between foreign and do-
mestic courts, even though the case may technically satisfy the re-
quirements for U.S. court jurisdiction and venue.47  In applying the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, the U.S. court assesses which juris-
diction has the greater interest in adjudicating the case by analyz-
ing the nationalities of the parties in interest, the location of the 
witnesses and evidence, public interest of the forum in relation to 
the events giving rise to the litigation, etc.48  Through this analysis, 
the U.S. law promotes efficient allocation of judicial resources, dis-
courages forum shopping from plaintiffs,49 and prevents the possi-
bility of “race to judgment” by potentially allowing parallel litiga-
tions in two different fora.50 
Precisely the same benefits would inure if the U.S. law estab-
lishes a system to recognize foreign provisional orders.  Consider 
Scenario 1:  the connection between the main litigation and the 
State of New York is quite tenuous, as the only connection of the 
case to the New York forum is that the defendant hid his property 
in the State of New York.  In a sense, one can argue that Tycoon X 
engaged in an indirect type of forum shopping by choosing to 
place his property in New York so as to frustrate his creditors.  But 
for the New York property, it is likely that a case filed with the 
47 See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.17 (3d ed. 1999); 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 111.70–.95 (3d ed. 1997); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (2d ed.
1986 & Supp. 2003).  For detailed discussion regarding the way in which the
courts employ forum non conveniens doctrine to allocate judicial responsibility be-
tween foreign and domestic courts, see Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Fo-
rum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 516–28 (2011).
48 See Piper Aircraft, Inc. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (considering location of 
parties, location of witnesses, location of potential third parties to be impleaded, 
etc. to dismiss a case based on forum non conveniens). 
49 See Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial 
Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 141, 158 (1998) (arguing “that the use of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine has evolved to solve the peculiar problems posed by international forum 
shopping and that U.S. courts should continue to make pragmatic use of the doc-
trine to protect MNCs from the burdens of defending foreign suits in the United 
States.”). 
50 See Roland A. Brand, Tug of War:  The Tension Between Regulation and Inter-
nal Cooperation:  Challenges to Forum Non Conveniens, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1003, 1008 (2013) (discussing recent internal and external challenges to the forum 
non conveniens doctrine and where the evolutionary development of the doctrine 
might go in the future). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
1018 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
New York court in relation to Scenario 1 would be dismissed on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds, as all the parties in interest are Korean 
nationals (recall that even Tycoon X’s children are Korean nation-
als,) the defendant Tycoon X incurred the debt in Korea, and all 
relevant witnesses and documentary evidence are located in Ko-
rea.51  
Establishing a system of recognizing foreign provisional orders 
is the best way to address this concern.  Theoretically, it is possible 
for the Korean creditors in Scenario 1 to petition the New York 
court to issue the provisional relief while the litigation in Korea is 
ongoing.52  However, as discussed above, this gives time for the 
debtor defendant to abscond with the property to another jurisdic-
tion that the creditor cannot reach.  In addition, to analyze whether 
the plaintiff may obtain a provisional relief, the New York court 
must analyze the main proceeding’s likelihood of success, as re-
quired by New York law.53  (Indeed, majority of jurisdictions in the 
United States requires the court to assess the likelihood of success 
of the main action before issuing provisional relief.)54  This means 
that the New York court is put in the uncomfortable position of as-
sessing the likelihood of success for the plaintiff’s litigation pend-
ing in Korea.  In other words, not only do the creditors have to re-
litigate the same lawsuit that they already won in a different fo-
rum, but also they must rely on the New York court, which is not 
familiar with Korea’s law, business custom or language, to analyze 
the litigation pending in Korea, in order to render the correct re-
sult.  (Which, in this case, is the issuance of a provisional order be-
cause of the risk of the defendant’s fraudulent transfer.)  If the New 
York court should rule erroneously, it would create a result that is 
inconsistent with the main litigation pending in Korea, as the Ko-
rean court already issued an attachment order in Scenario 1. 
In the interest of judicial economy and justice, a summary pro-
cedure in which Tycoon X’s creditors can simply bring the provi-
sional order that the Korean court issued, and obtain recognition of 
51 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241-43. 
52 See, e.g., Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802. 
53 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6212(a) (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York 
Annotated) (detailing plaintiff’s burden on a motion for an order of attachment). 
54 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 484.090(a)(2); FLA. STAT. § 76.24(1); MASS. R. CIV.
P. 4.1(c); N.J. PRAC. CT. R. 4:60-5(a)(1); but see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278d(a) (a
“probable cause” standard for obtaining attachment, which is significantly lower
than the “likelihood of success on the merits” standard).
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the order from the New York court, would be preferable.  Of 
course, Tycoon X and his children—debtor and garnishees, respec-
tively—would be able to raise defenses to resist the recognition.  
Once the Korean provisional order is recognized, the creditors 
would be able to enforce the order in New York, as if a New York 
court issued the order.  Indeed, in many states, that is precisely 
how it works with certain types of foreign final judgments.55  Such 
a procedure would avoid duplicative litigation, give the creditors a 
realistic chance to arrest the property, and spare the U.S. courts 
from having to venture into a foreign case and foreign law. 
Recognition of foreign provisional orders, however, is not only 
geared toward avoiding the involvement of U.S. courts.  Scenario 2 
depicts the rarer, but realistic, situation in which U.S. courts should 
be more involved in the enforcement of foreign provisional orders.  
Whereas the New York court is involved too much in Scenario 1, it 
is not involved enough in Scenario 2.  The UK court’s provisional 
order in Scenario 2 did not simply infringe upon the property 
rights of a New York resident and a U.S. citizen; it also sought to 
bind third parties such as Hotelier Y’s banks and business counter-
parts, who are not under the UK court’s jurisdiction.  The UK 
plaintiffs obtained a provisional order from the UK court on ex 
parte basis, and sought to enforce the order ex parte as well by send-
ing informal letters rather than formally serving process.  As a re-
sult, Hotelier Y is deprived of the use of her property, which is lo-
cated outside of the UK court’s jurisdiction.  All of the foregoing 
violates Y’s constitutional rights for Due Process.56  
In addition to violating Hotelier Y’s constitutional rights, the 
UK plaintiff’s behavior in Scenario 2 is the antithesis of orderly 
administration of justice.  If Scenario 2 occurred in the United 
States as an entirely domestic matter, the plaintiffs would have had 
to follow the New York state law providing for a restraining order 
and garnishment, which protects the property interest of both the 
defendant Hotelier Y as well as the third parties who are holding 
55 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301–09 (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New 
York Annotated) (providing for summary recognition of foreign money judg-
ments).  See further discussion infra at Section 4. 
56 See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (holding that a Connecticut 
statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of a defendant’s real property upon 
the filing of an action, without prior notice or hearing, without a showing of ex-
traordinary circumstances, and without a requirement that the plaintiff post a 
bond, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the defendant’s property, as both the defendant and the third party 
garnishees would be entitled to notice and hearing, in which they 
may raise certain defenses.57  If the plaintiffs were seeking to re-
strain Hotelier Y’s property in connection with a New York court 
action, the plaintiffs would have had to issue a restraining notice 
pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5222, which 
provides that the party that issues a restraining notice must pro-
vide a notice to the obligor (in this case, Hotelier Y,) in a specific 
format that informs of the obligor’s rights and in a manner de-
signed for the obligor to actually receive notice.58  The plaintiffs al-
so would have had to formally serve the restraining notice to any 
third party that holds the obligor’s property.59  In response, Hotel-
ier Y would have had the opportunity to object to the restraint en-
tirely, or claim specific exemptions.60  The third parties who hold 
Hotelier Y’s property may likewise object to the restraint.61  Finally, 
before any property exchanges hands, there would be a court pro-
ceeding to ensure that the plaintiff is indeed entitled to receive the 
defendant’s property.62 
None of the above protections of the U.S. national debtor can 
be present in Scenario 2, because the United States has no mecha-
nism for handling an interim relief that a foreign court issued.  The 
absence of a system to address a foreign provisional order allows 
for a possibility of unruly self-help, of the kind in which the UK 
plaintiffs was engaged in Scenario 2 by sending informal letters 
that was not sanctioned by the court.  For the sake of protecting 
constitutional Due Process rights and orderly administration of jus-
57 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5222 & 5225(b) (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of 
New York Annotated) (providing for issuance of restraining notice and payment 
or delivery of the property of judgment debtor).  For a discussion on defenses 
against recognition and enforcement generally, see discussion infra at Section 4. 
58 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5222(d)-(g) (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New 
York Annotated) (providing for issuance of restraining notice). 
59 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5222(a) & 5222-a(b) (McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of 
New York Annotated) (providing for issuance of restraining notice). 
60 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222-a. 
61 See, e.g., Verizon New England Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 98 
A.D.3d 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012) (noting that in a C.P.L.R. article 52
turnover proceeding, the judgment creditor could not enforce a restraining notice
against the third-party garnishee); JSC Foreign Economic Ass’n Technostroyex-
port v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that restraining notices would be properly limited to corporate assets).
62 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225. 
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tice, it would be preferable to force the UK plaintiff to convert the 
Mareva order into a U.S. order first, such that the New York court 
may exercise oversight over the res located in New York in a way 
that minimizes the infringement of the U.S. citizen’s property 
rights, and properly exercise jurisdiction over the third parties lo-
cated within the New York court’s jurisdiction.  
3.4.   Creation of U.S.-Led Ecosystem of Private International Law 
The two benefits discussed in the foregoing may be character-
ized as “domestic” benefits that a provisional order recognition 
system confers to U.S. courts, in that such a system would allow 
the U.S. judiciary to vindicate justice and have effective administra-
tion of its courts.  The third benefit, in contrast, may be character-
ized as an “international” or “diplomatic” benefit:  establishing a 
streamlined procedure for recognizing foreign provisional orders 
which would also allow the United States to claim the leadership 
position in the formation of private international law, which it had 
lost over the past two decades.   
To explain this point, a brief historical review of this area of in-
ternational law is necessary.  The United States did previously at-
tempt to establish a procedure to recognize foreign provisional or-
ders, and much more.  American scholars have noted that, in the 
area of private international law, the United States was at a par-
ticular disadvantage.  European courts had far-reaching jurisdic-
tion that may subject U.S. nationals, and the resulting European 
judgments could be easily recognized and enforced in the United 
States.  Meanwhile, European courts have been “rather stingy” 
with extending recognition and enforcement of U.S. court judg-
ments.63   
To address this imbalance, in 1992, the U.S. proposed a new 
project that would result in a worldwide convention on jurisdic-
tion, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, at 
the Hague Conference on private international law.64  The project 
63 Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in A GLOBAL
LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 4 (John J. Barcelo 
III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (hereinafter “GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION
AND JUDGMENTS”). 
64 See Letter from the U.S. Department of State to the Secretary General of the 
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resulted in the draft convention (the “Proposed Hague Conven-
tion”) intended for adoption at the Hague Conference in 2000.65  
The Proposed Hague Convention would have addressed the provi-
sional order recognition issue and a lot more, as it was an ambi-
tious proposal that would have given clarity for jurisdiction in a 
transnational case as well as the recognition and enforcement of fi-
nal judgments.66  Specifically, the Proposed Hague Convention 
would have established a “whitelist” of jurisdictional bases, under 
which each signatory country must exercise jurisdiction, a “black-
list” under which each signatory must decline jurisdiction, and 
“gray zone” of jurisdictional bases that fall in between the two 
lists.67  The signatories to the Proposed Hague Convention would 
recognize each other’s judgments, although they may choose to de-
cline recognition of the cases arising from the “gray zone” of juris-
dictional bases.68  And (for the purpose of this paper) importantly, 
the Proposed Hague Convention would have provided for a mech-
anism for transnational issuance, recognition and enforcement of 
provisional protective measures.69  Under the Proposed Hague 
Convention, there are three grounds for a court to have jurisdiction 
to issue a provisional order:  (1) the court has jurisdiction to adju-
dicate the main litigation; (2) the court is where property is located, 
in which the court may issue provisional orders with respect to 
that property, and; (3) the court is acting, on an interim basis, to 
protect a claim on the merits that is either pending or about to be 
brought by the requesting party, in which case the provisional or-
Hague Conference on Private International Law, May 5, 1992, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/65973.pdf [https://perma.cc/J227-
QSAZ]. 
65 See Barcelo & Clermont, General Introduction, in GLOBAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 1. 
66 For the text of the Proposed Hague Convention, see International Jurisdic-
tion and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prel. Doc. No. 7, 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, April 
1997, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LTA4-S4KF]. 
67 Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in GLOBAL LAW OF 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 6-7. 
68 See id. 
69 See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 66, at ¶126 (noting that “rules 
of jurisdiction concerning provisional and protective measures . . .  are essential, 
especially in the international arena”); see also Clermont, An Introduction to the 
Hague Convention, in GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 
7.
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der’s enforcement is limited to the territory of signatory state to 
which the court belongs.70 
The Proposed Hague Convention, had it come to fruition, 
would have gone a long way towards harmonizing critical parts of 
international civil litigation; namely, jurisdiction, provisional or-
ders, and final judgments.  However, after a decade of negotiation, 
the Proposed Hague Convention failed.71  Though the Proposed 
Hague Convention arguably failed for many reasons, 72 I would ar-
gue that those reasons ultimately point to a single underlying 
cause:  the dependency of the Proposed Hague Convention’s path 
on the existing European system.73  The Proposed Hague Conven-
tion tracked the structure of the system that the EU nations used 
for harmonizing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, and 
this path dependency gave rise to the suboptimal result.   
The European system, enshrined in Brussels and Lugano Con-
ventions, is a “double convention” that deals with jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments (and provisional reliefs) at the same time.  
The double convention structure has the benefit of rationally 
streamlining the entire process of beginning and finishing litiga-
tion, and it made sense—or so it appeared at the time—for the 
70 See Proposed Hague Convention, supra note 66, at ¶¶81, 114, 126.  Note, 
however, that the Proposed Hague Convention did not address certain important 
issues involving transnational provisional orders, such as:  (1) whether the juris-
diction of the court of one country to issue a provisional order precludes other 
countries from issuing a provisional order, or; (2) whether one country may issue 
a provisional order when the court before which the main action is pending, hav-
ing jurisdiction to issue a provisional order, declines to issue the same provisional 
order.  See Lawrence Collins, Special Problems, in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:  RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE HELD AT NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW ON THE PROPOSED CONVENTION 104-106 (Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman eds., 2001) (hereinafter “NYU CONFERENCE 
RECORD”). 
71 Some Reflections on the Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments 
Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of the Conference, Prel. 
Doc. No. 16, Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, April 2002, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd16e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M562-UQDV]. 
72 See generally Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negoti-
ating a Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments: Some Initial Lessons, in GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 63, at 262, 264. 
73 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld noted that the Brussels Convention was “the 
starting point, if not quite the form book” for the Proposed Hague Convention.  
Andreas J. Lowenfeld, Setting the Stage, in NYU CONFERENCE RECORD, supra note 
70, at 3. 
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Proposed Hague Convention to be structured similarly.74  But once 
the negotiation began, it became clear that bundling all the con-
cepts ensured none of concepts survived the scrutiny of the parties 
to the Proposed Hague Convention.  Rather than separately pursu-
ing some of the concepts on which the parties may have reached an 
agreement more easily, the Proposed Hague Convention insisted 
that all the operative parts of the Proposed Convention rose or fell 
together.   
In the end, they fell.  The United States found the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Proposed Hague Convention hugely problematic, 
as they would have upended more than a century of American 
precedents regarding jurisdiction and Due Process.75  The Europe-
an nations, for example, would not tolerate the U.S. legal principle 
of general jurisdiction arising from continuous and systematic ac-
tivities in the forum, and the attendant prospect of having more of 
its citizens involved in U.S. litigation, which is known for conduct-
ing wide-ranging and expensive discovery as well as for handing 
down huge damages.76  A case like Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Inter-
national,77 in which the New York court asserted jurisdiction over a 
slip-and-fall that happened in a hotel in London because the Lon-
don hotel advertised and booked reservations through a system in 
74 For the discussion of the need to address these related concepts in a single 
multinational agreement, see, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibrium, 
the Proposed Hague Convention, and Progress in National Law, in GLOBAL LAW OF 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 117.  See also Lowenfeld, NYU 
CONFERENCE RECORD, supra note 70, at 2 (“[I]f a basic principle was that judgments 
of member states should be recognized if the first forum had jurisdiction, they had 
better agree on the rules of jurisdiction as well”). 
75 See Trooboff, GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 72, at 
265–66. 
76 See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get it?, 24 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 167, 187–188 (1998) (“Europeans do not see how doing business unrelated 
to the lawsuit could establish jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation omitted); Eric Por-
terfield, A Domestic Proposal to Revive the Hague Judgments Convention:  How to Stop 
Worrying About Streams, Trickles, Asymmetry, and a Lack of Reciprocity, 25 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 81, 106–107 (2014) (“The European countries’ real objection seems 
to be the conduct of American litigation, with its wide-ranging discovery and the 
prospect of large damages”). 
77 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 1967) (holding 
that since the British hotel corporation owned a reservation service, which con-
ducted public relations and publicity work and transmitted requests for reserva-
tions to British hotel from New York, and thus was ‘doing business’ in New York, 
the British corporation was subjected to suit in New York). 
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New York, is well-grounded in U.S. law, and unthinkable in Eu-
rope.78  Similarly problematic for the European parties was the 
“tag” jurisdiction, which the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ap-
proved in Burnham v. Superior Court.79  In addition, some of the ju-
risdictional provisions in the Proposed Hague Convention—most 
notably, conferring jurisdiction in a tort action based on the place 
of injury—were likely to be unconstitutional under the Constitu-
tion of the United States.80 
In the end, these differences were too great to be bridged.  In a 
letter to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference, dated Feb-
ruary 22, 2000, the head of the U.S. delegation, Jeffrey Kovar, stated 
bluntly:  
[T]he project as currently embodied in the October 1999
preliminary draft convention stands no chance of being ac-
cepted in the United States.  Moreover, our assessment is
that the negotiating process so far demonstrates no foresee-
able possibility for correcting what for us are fatal defects in
the approach, structure, and details of the text.  In our view,
there has not been adequate progress toward the creation of
a draft convention that would represent a worldwide com-
78 But it must be noted that, through Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 745 (2014), 
the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted the use of “doing business” as grounds for 
general jurisdiction.  Commentators have noted that such cases would narrow the 
difference between the positions of the United States and the European Union.  
See Weintraub, supra note 76, at 186 n.117; Porterfield, supra note 76, at 83. 
79 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604 
(1990) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on service on the 
defendant while in the state comports with traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice). 
80 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (hold-
ing that jurisdiction cannot always be exercised at the place of injury under the 
Due Process Clause).  For discussion regarding the interaction between the Pro-
posed Hague Convention and the US-EU differences tort jurisdiction, see Audrey 
Feldman, Rethinking Review of Foreign Court Jurisdiction in Light of the Hague Judg-
ment Negotiations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2190 (2014).  Had the Proposed Hague Con-
vention passed, there is significant possibility that the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States would find the Convention unenforceable to the extent that it conflicted 
with Due Process.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that a treaty that 
provided for military trial over a civilian spouse of a soldier stationed abroad is 
unconstitutional to the extent it conflicts with the constitutional right for a trial by 
jury); Porterfield, supra note 76, at 109–110. 
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promise among extremely different legal systems.81 
The European nations, on the other hand, balked at the pro-
spect of having to recognize U.S. judgments in their courts.  Be-
cause U.S. courts have a reputation of handing down massive 
judgments, the non-U.S. parties feared the possibility that a U.S. 
judgment could be enforceable within their borders.82  Further, 
even without the Proposed Hague Convention, EU nations had lit-
tle trouble having their judgments recognized in the United States 
because the U.S. has been a generous forum in recognizing foreign 
final judgments without requiring reciprocity, i.e. the requirement 
that the foreign country would also recognize the U.S. judgment.83  
Since the non-U.S. parties can readily obtain recognition of their 
judgments in U.S. courts, the non-U.S. parties did not have much 
more to gain by entering into the Proposed Hague Convention. 
The United States, on the other hand, has no additional incentive to 
offer to the non-U.S. parties to join.  (One of the American dele-
gates to the Hague Conference noted:  “Less than facetiously, sev-
eral in our delegation have suggested that the bargaining process 
might be somewhat different if the chair of the judiciary commit-
tees in the House or the Senate were to introduce in the United 
States Congress the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.”)84  
With both the United States and the European Union finding fault 
in different parts, the Proposed Hague Convention was doomed.85 
81 Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Interna-
tional Law to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, Feb. 22, 2000, http://www.cptech.org/ecom/hague/
kovar2loon22022000.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6QF-BF7Q]; see also Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign 
Judgments Acceptable Worldwide:  Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, in 
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 282. 
82 See Trooboff, supra note 72, at 267. 
83 Clermont, supra note 63, at 5 (“But the United States has little bargaining 
power.  It needs a convention, while the Europeans have little to gain over their 
presently favorable situation.”). 
84 Trooboff, supra note 72, at 264.  The proposed Foreign Judgments Recogni-
tion and Enforcement Act, which is federal legislation that the American Law In-
stitute prepared in response to the failure of the Proposed Hague Convention, 
does exactly that by requiring reciprocity in recognition of a foreign judgment.  
See American Law Institute, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, at xiii–xiv. 
85 It is worth noting that two subsequent developments mitigated the failure 
of the Proposed Hague Convention.  First, the Hague Conference promulgated 
the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Choice of Court Conven-
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My view is that, ultimately, the Proposed Hague Convention 
failed because it hewed too closely to EU’s Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions.  Like the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Con-
vention, the Proposed Hague Convention bundled the problems of 
jurisdiction, recognition of judgment, and provisional reliefs in the 
same package.  Negotiation and compromise generally require the 
opposing parties to meet halfway.  However, the Proposed Hague 
Convention was essentially asking the United States to travel most 
of the way, while the European Union stayed put.  Signing onto an 
expanded version of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions would 
have incurred comparatively little cost to the European Union, 
while the same would have incurred significant cost to the United 
States, which would have to fundamentally upend the century-old 
U.S. jurisprudence regarding personal jurisdiction and Due Pro-
cess.86  In the end, the United States refused to travel that distance, 
which led to the failure of the Proposed Hague Convention.  
Perhaps there is a different way.  The challenge for the United 
States is to induce the European Union to meet halfway.  To that 
end:  what if the U.S. changed the center of gravity on the negotiat-
ing table?  What if the United States began creating an internation-
al judicial system that runs parallel to the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions?  Going back to the negotiating table for the Proposed 
Hague Convention with a number of states within the U.S.-led ju-
dicial ecosystem, whose scale of economy and global reach would 
tion”), which came into effect on October 1, 2015.  The Choice of Court Conven-
tion mandates that, subject to certain exceptions, a court designated by a choice of 
court clause in a contract must exercise jurisdiction over a dispute regarding the 
contract, and all other courts must relinquish jurisdiction.  See Hague Conf. of Pri-
vate Int’l Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Concluded June 30, 2005) 
at Arts. 5–6, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-
e0972510d98b.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9NW-5ZLT].  A judgment rendered under 
the Choice of Court Convention is to be given recognition and enforcement 
among contracting states.  See id. at Art. 8–9.  Second, negotiations for a reduced 
version of the Proposed Hague Convention, which would only govern the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments (and not jurisdiction, except to the extent 
that a jurisdictional filter may apply to the judgments) resumed recently in 2012.  
See Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (Apr. 17–20, 2012), 
Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the 
Council at 3–4 (Apr. 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012concl_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B3F-3FTR].  Notably for the purpose of this paper, nei-
ther the Choice of Court Convention nor the reduced version of the Proposed 
Hague Convention addresses the issue of recognizing and enforcing foreign pro-
visional orders. 
86 See supra, text accompanying note 80. 
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be irresistible to the EU, and would provide the United States with 
much more leverage.  Building an international system for recogni-
tion of foreign provisional orders may be the first step in that series 
of small steps that would lead to the creation of the U.S.-led judi-
cial ecosystem.  Indeed, taking this incremental step may even in-
duce individual European states to join in the U.S.-led system, 
which may lead to greater cooperation in the future. 
De-coupling the recognition of foreign provisional orders from 
other topics within the Proposed Hague Convention solves much 
of the difficulties that became apparent during the negotiation of 
the Proposed Hague Convention.  First, unlike with the Proposed 
Hague Convention’s allocation of jurisdiction, recognition of for-
eign provisional orders is minimally disruptive to the existing U.S. 
law.  In determining whether a particular foreign provisional order 
should receive recognition in the United States, U.S. courts can 
readily borrow from pre-existing bodies of American law, depend-
ing on the precise mechanism through which foreign provisional 
orders would be recognized.87  For example, if the U.S. courts judi-
cially craft a mechanism for the recognition of foreign provisional 
orders, the forum non conveniens standard may be borrowed.88  That 
is, if the case sub judice would satisfy the forum non conveniens 
standard but for the fortuitous presence of defendant’s assets in the 
U.S. court’s jurisdiction, the U.S. court has relatively little interest 
in being involved in the case.  In such a case, the U.S. court may 
decide to give recognition to a foreign provisional order, since un-
der the forum non conveniens standard, the U.S. court was unlikely 
to exercise jurisdiction at any rate.  For another example, if the U.S. 
legislatures—either the U.S. Congress or various state legisla-
tures—should pass a statute that provides for the recognition of 
foreign provisional orders, adjudication of the recognition of for-
eign provisional orders can borrow from the existing case law re-
garding the recognition of foreign final judgments.89   
Second, unlike U.S. final judgments, U.S. provisional orders do 
not have the reputation of being unduly harsh or liberally doled 
out.  Although the full comparative overview of various provision-
87 For discussion on various possible mechanisms through which recognition 
of foreign provisional orders may be achieved, see infra Section 4. 
88 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241–243; Whytock, supra note 47. 
89 For discussion on the prospect of legislative solution for recognition of for-
eign provisional orders, see infra Section 4.2. 
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al reliefs available worldwide is beyond the scope of this paper, it 
appears likely that UK provisional orders, which include the infa-
mous Mareva and Anton Piller orders (dubbed “nuclear weapons of 
the law,”) have the dubious distinction of being the most feared 
provisional orders in the world.90  Because foreign countries do not 
particularly fear giving recognition to U.S. provisional orders, it is 
easier for the United States to establish a system of mutual and re-
ciprocal recognition of provisional orders with a foreign state.  Fi-
nally, unlike the case with final judgments, the U.S. currently does 
not yet have a system of recognizing foreign provisional orders—
which would incentivize foreign nations to join the U.S.-led system 
of giving recognition to provisional orders, since they would stand 
to gain the additional benefit of having their court’s provisional 
orders given recognition in the United States. 
Reciprocity is the key concept for this strategy:  the United 
States needs a system in which it would recognize provisional or-
ders issued by a foreign court, and the same foreign court would 
recognize the U.S. provisional order in return.  In a decentralized 
system that depends on horizontal negotiations rather than a top-
down directive, reciprocity plays a critical role in harmonizing the 
laws of different legal systems.  For example, France abandoned its 
practice of invasively reviewing foreign judgments in 1964 as 
Germany placed a reciprocity requirement in recognizing and en-
forcing foreign judgments.91  Similarly, with a recognition system 
that requires reciprocity, the U.S. can begin constructing its own 
international jurisprudential ecosystem, which would eventually 
develop into a judicial collective similar to the one existing in the 
European Union under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.   
The multinational system of giving recognition to provisional 
orders would eventually spill over into harmonization of other ar-
eas, as the full harmonization of provisional orders cannot help but 
90 Kern Alexander, The Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order: The Nuclear 
Weapons of English Commercial Litigation, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 487, 488 (1997).  For dis-
cussion regarding potential extraterritorial abuses of Mareva orders, see Wilson, 
supra note 19. 
91 See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 512 (2003) (arguing that courts should apply a sort of “antiparochialism” 
canon in deciding process-related issues in transnational cases: specifically, they 
should choose a course that furthers the development of an ordered, functional, 
international judicial system through doctrines that foster dialogue among partic-
ipants in the system). 
. 
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involve other areas of the law.  For example, an international anti-
suit injunction—with which the court of one country orders the 
party to stop pursuing litigation in another country—is a provi-
sional relief that essentially demands harmonization of jurisdiction 
between the two countries.92  Recognition of foreign anti-suit in-
junctions necessarily means that there will be harmonization of ju-
risdictions between the United States and the foreign forum.  Over 
time, this type of spillover would eventually develop into its own 
international judicial ecosystem, akin to the ecosystem created by 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, but under U.S. leadership.  
Such an ecosystem would provide for a streamlined procedure for 
transnational litigation that covers the beginning of litigation (ju-
risdiction), the end of litigation (enforcement of judgment), and the 
events in between (provisional reliefs). 
The best initial target signatories for this ecosystem would be 
U.S.-friendly trade partners that are not within the European order,
such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey.
In many ways, the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) could serve as a model.93  The signatories for the TPP include
Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Vietnam, New
Zealand, Chile, and Singapore—all U.S.-friendly economies of sig-
nificant size that are not within the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions order.  The TPP also includes important international law
provisions, most notably a dispute settlement mechanism between
an investor and a state.94  In the future rounds of multilateral trade
pacts, such as the TPP, one can easily imagine a mutual recognition
system of provisional reliefs becoming one of the agreed provi-
sions.  As the U.S.-led free trade ecosystem, backed by U.S.-led pri-
92 Arthur von Mehren, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 279 (2007) (anti-suit injunction is “an instrument of 
fine-tuning” competing jurisdictions).  It must be noted that an anti-suit injunction 
is mostly a feature of common law jurisdictions, as most civil law jurisdictions re-
ject the use of anti-suit injunctions.  See id.  However, as discussed infra, the U.S.-
led judicial ecosystem would necessarily include many significant common law 
jurisdictions that are outside of the order created by the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions, such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
93 Trans-Pacific Partnership, full text, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/
FJ3G-H2FE]. 
94 Dispute Settlement, Trans-Pacific Partnership Ch. 28, https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Dispute-Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K9XH-JPA9].  
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vate international law, grows in size, the network effect would in-
crease the pressure upon the rest of the world to join.   
Eventually, the size and influence of the U.S.-led private inter-
national law ecosystem would become enough to incentivize the 
European nations to step out of their comfort zone within the Brus-
sels and Lugano Conventions system.  When that does happen, the 
parties may revisit the Proposed Hague Convention structure and 
address the entire lifecycle of transnational litigation (i.e. jurisdic-
tion, provisional relief, judgment recognition, and enforcement), or 
engage in the gradual harmonization of the components of a trans-
national litigation.  
4. DESIGNING THE SYSTEM OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN PROVISIONAL ORDERS:  THREE POSSIBILITIES
Having discussed the necessity for establishing a system of 
recognizing foreign provisional orders, this part of the paper will 
describe and assess three possible routes forward:  judicial, legisla-
tive, and treaty-based.  All three routes may lead the U.S. law to-
ward having a coherent system of recognizing and enforcing for-
eign provisional orders—that is, all three routes may produce a 
system equipped with all the essential features required to reap the 
benefits of giving recognition to foreign provisional orders.  Such 
features may include:  a summary procedure to ensure expeditious 
execution of the provisional order; defenses that the party resisting 
the recognition and enforcement of the foreign provisional order 
may raise, in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution; mandatory and discretionary bases under 
which the court may respond flexibly in recognizing and enforcing 
foreign provisional orders; a reciprocity requirement in order to 
induce foreign legal systems to recognize U.S. provisional orders, 
etc.  However, in order to fully realize the triple benefits of estab-
lishing this system discussed above, and in consideration of the re-
ality of the current legal landscape, as well as the tendencies of the 
institutions that correlate to these three possible paths, it appears 
that the legislative option is superior to the judicial one, and the 
treaty-based option is superior to both the other two.   
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4.1.   Judicial Option:  Resurrection of Hilton v. Guyot 
The judicial option envisions a gradual construction of the sys-
tem of recognizing foreign provisional orders through a series of 
case law.  There is already precedent for constructing such a sys-
tem.  The possibility of judicially creating a system of recognizing 
foreign provisional orders flows from the Supreme Court case of 
Hilton v. Guyot, from 1895.95   
In Hilton, the Supreme Court considered whether U.S. courts 
may give recognition to a French judgment.  The Supreme Court 
answered in the negative, while acknowledging the possibility that 
a foreign judgment may be given recognition in the United States 
based on the principle of international comity.  But in the case of a 
judgment from France, according to the Supreme Court, interna-
tional comity was inapplicable because international comity re-
quired “mutuality and reciprocity,” and the French court at the 
time did not recognize the U.S. judgments.  Thus, Hilton pro-
pounded two important principles upon which it may be possible 
to construct a system of giving recognition to foreign provisional 
orders: (1) international comity allows U.S. courts to give recogni-
tion to foreign court orders, so long as; (2) the foreign court also re-
ciprocates by giving recognition to U.S. court orders in return.  
Based on these two principles, the U.S. courts may begin to fashion 
a systematic approach to recognizing foreign provisional orders 
through case law. 
The judicial option, however, faces major challenges.  The first 
challenge is the current landscape of the U.S. law.  Subsequent de-
velopments in American law have rendered the Hilton principles 
all but forgotten.  In 1938, the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins held that there is no general federal common law, and 
that federal courts with diversity jurisdiction must follow the sub-
stantive law of the state in which they are sitting. 96  Because there 
was no federal statute or treaty governing judgment recognition, 
federal courts ignored the holding in Hilton v. Guyot and followed 
instead the state law on foreign judgment recognition.97  Instead of 
95 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
96 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
97 See generally Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of 
Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement 
Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 251 (2004). 
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the Hilton principles, 33 states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted some version of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment 
Recognition Act (“UFMJRA”), which governs whether a foreign 
judgment may receive recognition from a U.S. court.98  Although 
there is no equivalent of UFMJRA for foreign provisional orders, 
one can make a strong argument that under Erie, federal courts 
cannot fashion a system of giving recognition to foreign provision-
al orders absent a federal statute, because there is no general feder-
al common law.  Given that the vast majority of transnational liti-
gation happens at the federal level, this is a significant roadblock. 
Significant, but not insurmountable.  It may be possible for 
state courts to fashion a system of giving recognition to foreign 
provisional orders.  As discussed previously, some state courts 
have held that foreign provisional orders, in relation to matrimoni-
al actions, may be given recognition. 99  Those states would only 
have to extend the recognition to provisional orders in other types 
of actions.  Alternatively, federal courts may yet decide to federal-
ize the law regarding recognition of foreign court orders, based on 
the plenary powers regarding foreign affairs, which was given to 
the federal government in the United States Constitution.  Alt-
hough Erie held that there was no general federal common law, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that certain narrowly defined areas 
involving “uniquely federal interests” are regulated by federal 
common law, and the state law in those areas is preempted and re-
placed.100  The conduct of the United States foreign relations, it has 
been held, is one of the areas that implicates such uniquely federal 
interests.101  The federal courts may determine that recognition of 
98 See Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage:  Jurisdictional Competition 
and the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 459, 491–498 (2013) (explaining the UFMJRA).  Even states that did not pass
the UFMJRA usually give liberal recognition for foreign judgments under the
state’s Common Law.  See id. at 498–499.
99 See supra note 6.  
100 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).  Even in 
such “uniquely federal” areas, federal common law will be fashioned only to pre-
vent “significant conflict” between state laws and federal policies and interests.  
See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1994). 
101 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407, 423 
(1964) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)) (noting that the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in this instance since “the issues involved bear importantly on 
the conduct of the country's foreign relations,” however, not “every case or con-
troversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance”); 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (noting that State law may have “a 
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foreign provisional orders involves “uniquely federal interests” in 
the regulation of foreign relations, and thus begin to craft a system 
of recognition. 
Practical considerations, however, lead one to doubt that the 
U.S. courts will attempt to meet this challenge.  Therein lies the 
second challenge for the judicial option:  the fundamental cognitive 
challenge that U.S. jurisprudence has with respect to transnational 
litigation.  Because of its long tradition of handling conflict-of-law 
cases in the context of different states belonging to the same federa-
tion, American courts generally do not distinguish transnational 
litigation from inter-state litigation.102  Rather than approaching 
transnational litigation as an independent category deserving of 
legal analysis that examines its peculiarity, U.S. courts tend to 
equate foreign nations with one of its states, with little to no sepa-
rate considerations for international comity.103  Professor Stephen 
Burbank noted that under U.S. law, neither international litigation 
nor international civil litigation is a discrete field, as U.S. courts 
“have brought to bear doctrine and techniques developed in do-
mestic cases.”104  While hope springs eternal, it does not appear 
likely to the practical-minded that any minute now, the U.S. courts 
will break their long-standing habit of ignoring the meaningful dif-
                                                                                                                                   
direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of 
the central government to deal with those problems,” and in that instance must be 
limited). 
102 See Trooboff, supra note 72, at 264, observing that: 
In general, American courts have not subjected judgments from the 
courts of other nations to a separate test to determine whether they are 
entitled to recognition and enforcement.  Rather, the courts of the United 
States revert to acting as they would if they were confronting a domestic 
case that raised an issue as to whether the originating court had properly 
asserted jurisdiction.  
See also Stephen B. Burbank, Practice and Procedure:  the World in Our Courts, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1458–59 (1991) (raising doubt as to whether transnational liti-
gation may be considered a separate field within U.S. law); Bermann, supra note 
12, at 560 (noting U.S. court’s indifference toward parties’ nationalities in granting 
provisional relief). 
103 Another example of this trend in American jurisprudence:  Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws calls for recognition of foreign injunctive orders be-
cause “American courts . . . have usually given the same measure of respect to 
judgments rendered in foreign nations . . . that they give to judgments rendered in 
sister States.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1971). 
104 Burbank, supra note 102, at 1459. 
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ferences between inter-state litigation and transnational litigation 
in order to construct a system of giving recognition to foreign pro-
visional orders. 
4.2.   Legislative Option:  UFMJRA as a Model 
The legislative option would involve the legislatures of the 
United States—either the Congress, the federal legislature, or vari-
ous state legislatures—passing legislation that provides for sys-
tematic recognition of foreign provisional orders.  This option ben-
efits from having the ready model from which to emulate—that is, 
the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA).  
UFMJRA is a model act promulgated by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  Thus far, 33 states and 
the District of Columbia have adopted some variant of the 
UFMJRA.105  Under the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recog-
nition Act, parties may petition a U.S. court to recognize a money 
judgment rendered by a foreign court.  In general, as long as the 
foreign judgment is “final, conclusive, and enforceable where ren-
dered,”106 an American court will give recognition to the judgment 
and treat the foreign judgment as if the court itself rendered the 
judgment.  UFMJRA only recognizes a limited set of exceptions, in-
cluding the foreign court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, and the foreign judgment coming from a legal system that 
does not provide impartial tribunals.  Crucially, however, UFMJRA 
lacks the reciprocity requirement, allowing the recognition of for-
105  Shill, supra note 98, at 491–98.  Nine states (Alaska, Connecticut, Mary-
land, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virgin-
ia) adopted the version of UFMJRA proposed in 1962.  See id. at 492 n.164.  Eight-
een States (Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington) and the District of Columbia 
adopted the later version of UFMJRA (called Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognitions Act), proposed in 2005.  See id. at 492 n.165.  Compared to 
the 1962 UFMJRA, the 2005 UFMJRA has two more discretionary grounds for 
non-recognition and specifically allocates the burden of establishing non-
recognition grounds on the party resisting recognition.  See id. at 493–97.  Six 
states (Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Maine, Ohio, and Texas) adopted tailored 
statutes that were largely based on the 1962 UFMJRA, but with additional 
grounds for non-recognition, including lack of reciprocity.  See id. at 497. 
106 CIBC Mellon Trust, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (applying New York State’s version 
of the UFMJRA). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
1036 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
eign judgments rendered from a jurisdiction that does not in turn 
recognize U.S. judgments.107   
The legislative option would involve a statute similar to the 
UFMJRA, but with foreign provisional orders instead of foreign 
money judgments.108  As a precondition for recognition, the legisla-
tion would require that a foreign provisional order be valid and 
enforceable where issued, and provide for only a limited set of ex-
ceptions such as lack of impartial tribunals.  In order to gain the 
third benefit of building a U.S.-led judicial ecosystem, the legisla-
tion providing for recognition of foreign provisional orders would 
require reciprocity from other countries, unlike the UFMJRA. 
The imperfection of the UFMJRA as a model, however, makes 
the legislative option an inferior one.  One of the major imperfec-
tions is that UFMJRA is not a federal statute, applicable uniformly 
throughout the United States.  As noted earlier, the UFMJRA is a 
state law, developed in response to the constraints imposed by Erie 
and the lack of general federal common law.  The same constraints 
likely prevent our proposed legislation from becoming a federal 
statute.109  As noted earlier, there is sufficient room to argue that 
recognition of foreign court orders—be they an interim relief or a 
final judgment—falls within the domain of the federal government, 
under the U.S. Constitution, as it implicates foreign affairs.110  In-
107 The six states that enacted their own version of the UFMJRA—i.e. Florida, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, Maine, Ohio and Texas—included additional grounds for 
non-recognition, which includes of lack of reciprocity.  In Florida, Maine, Ohio 
and Texas, lack of reciprocity is a discretionary ground for non-recognition; in 
Georgia and Massachusetts, it is a mandatory ground.  See Shill, supra note 98, at 
497. 
108  Another potential model of note is the model statute developed by Amer-
ican Law Institute (“ALI”), titled Foreign Judgment Recognition and Enforcement 
Act (the “Proposed ALI Act”).  The Proposed ALI Act does require reciprocity as a 
precondition for recognition of final judgments.  See discussion supra at note 84. 
For general discussion regarding ALI’s model statute, see Miller, supra note 97, at 
26–287 ; Shill, supra note 98, at 509–10. 
109  See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386–
387 (1926) (holding that because recognition of a foreign judgment was “of private 
right rather than public relations,” recognition of foreign judgments only depend-
ed on the laws of the State of New York, without reference to the authority of the 
Supreme Court of the United States); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing 
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (not-
ing that judgements from sister states are “entitled to full faith and credit,” while 
foreign court judgments are merely “subject to principles of comity” under Penn-
sylvania law). 
110 See supra text accompanying Section 4.1. 
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deed, the American Law Institute makes that very argument in its 
support for the model law, titled Foreign Judgment Recognition 
and Enforcement Act, which would federalize the recognition of 
foreign final judgments.111  But given the trend in the U.S. law with 
respect to transnational litigation discussed in the foregoing, it ap-
pears less than likely that there would be a sudden about-face on 
this front, as federalization of the recognition laws would represent 
a major departure from the current practice.   
An alternative legislative option is to pass legislation authoriz-
ing recognition of foreign provisional orders in each of the 50 state 
legislatures.  Given the relative success of the UFMJRA, the state-
by-state approach is a viable path.  Yet the state-by-state approach 
would suffer from the same shortcomings that the UFMJRA does; 
namely the state-to-state variations.  A significant minority of 
American states—seventeen in total—has not passed the 
UFMJRA.112  In these states, there is no expedited procedure for 
recognition of a foreign judgment; a civil action is required for the 
recognition of a judgment.  There is little reason to expect that 
these states would feel the need to pass a law that provides for 
summary recognition of foreign provisional orders.  In addition, 
not-insignificant differences exist among the versions of the 
UFMJRA adopted by the thirty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia, such as reciprocity requirements, mandatory and discre-
tionary grounds for non-recognition, and so on.113  
These shortcomings do not necessarily doom the legislative op-
tion.  In practicality, having a recognition law passed in just a 
handful of U.S. states that have much of the nation’s connections 
with the stream of international trade—such as California, New 
York, and Illinois—would go a long way toward achieving the 
benefits of giving recognition to foreign provisional orders.  But 
the shortcomings do exist with the legislative option, which makes 
the treaty-based option the most attractive one. 
111 See American Law Institute, supra note 84, at 3–4 (noting that the pro-
posed legislation would return the U.S. “to a national standard for recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments”). 
112 These states are:  Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.  See Shill, supra note 
98, at 498 n.194. 
113 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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4.3.   Treaty-Based Option:  Flexibility and Customization 
The treaty-based option envisions a bilateral or multilateral 
treaty into which the United States would enter with foreign na-
tions.114  Compared to the judicial or legislative options, the treaty-
based option is superior in several aspects. 
First, the treaty-based option is national in scope.  Because of 
the Erie doctrine, federal courts or Congress may be hesitant to 
promulgate a national standard for recognizing foreign provisional 
orders.  Not so with the executive branch:  as discussed above, the 
United States is already a party to several bilateral or multilateral 
treaties that give recognition to foreign provisional orders, albeit in 
limited areas of law, such as drug crimes or securities fraud.115  The 
recognition requirement, established by a treaty or a functionally 
equivalent agreement, would be applied nationally throughout the 
United States and pre-empt any inconsistent state law.116  
Second, the treaty-based option can bind foreign countries di-
rectly.  This has significant implications with respect to the third 
benefit of having a system of recognition for foreign provisional 
orders, namely building a U.S.-led judicial ecosystem.  Building 
such an ecosystem requires other countries to join the U.S.-led sys-
tem.  The judicial and legislative options cannot achieve this direct-
ly, as the U.S. courts and legislatures have no authority over for-
eign governments.  At best, the reciprocity requirement in the 
judicial and legislative options can only incentivize (rather than 
mandate) the foreign courts to recognize the U.S. interim reliefs.  In 
contrast, a treaty could directly impose the obligation to give 
recognition to U.S. provisional orders upon a foreign court. 
Third, the treaty-based option affords the maximum flexibility 
necessary to bridge the myriad of differences that exist between the 
114 The term “treaty,” for the purpose of this paper, may encompass func-
tionally equivalent international agreements such as a so-called “Congress-
Executive” agreement or an Executive agreement.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) . 
115 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
116 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (noting that treaties 
made by the national government “cannot be subject to any curtailment or inter-
ference on the part of the several states”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW §§ 111(3) & 303(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“courts of the United 
States are bound to give effect to . . . international agreements of the United State . 
. . .”). 
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legal systems of the United States and elsewhere.117  That flexibility 
would apply in several different contexts.  For example, a treaty-
based system can respond to the different variations in law that 
may arise between the U.S. and the foreign state.  A bilateral treaty, 
in particular, can respond far better to the differences in the legal 
concerns of the U.S. and the counter-signatory state than a multina-
tional convention could.  For example, the United States would be 
hesitant to recognize and enforce a foreign provisional order that 
restricts political speech, due to its strong speech protection en-
sured under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.118 
A treaty-based system may also be flexible regarding the types 
of provisional orders, so as to prioritize the less controversial type 
of provisional measures.119  Among the many different types of 
provisional orders, arguably, the least controversial is the prelimi-
nary attachment of defendants’ property in order to secure the po-
tential final judgment, because virtually every jurisdiction has such 
a provisional relief.120  The treaty regime may begin with mutual 
recognition of such attachment orders, and then gradually move 
onto more contentious areas, such as preliminary cease-and-desist 
orders.  Such incremental escalation would culminate at what is, 
arguably, the most controversial provisional order of all, namely 
anti-suit injunctions.121  Here, one can see clearly how taking the 
first step in constructing a system of mutual recognition of foreign 
provisional orders logically leads to constructing a private interna-
117 For a discussion on how bilateral treaties can navigate variations between 
different legal systems, see Lindsay Loudon Vest, Cross-Border Judgments and Public 
Policy Exception:  Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandry by way of Tribal Courts, 798 
U. PENN. L. REV.797, 813–814 (2004) (noting that through bilateral treaties, coun-
tries “have the power to pick and choose which signatory nations' judgments to
recognize,” thus the judgements of court systems recognized as being “fraught
with corruption” need not be reciprocally enforced).
118 See U.S. Const. amend. I (mandating that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech”).  Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (stating that 
U.S. courts need not recognize a foreign final judgment if “the cause of action on 
which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public 
policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is sought”). 
119 The UMFJRA is an example of the similar line of thought, as the law only 
applies to foreign money judgments and not to, say, injunctive orders. 
120 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
121 Bermann, supra note 12, at 615 (stating that the use of anti-suit injunctions 
may “precipitate international judicial warfare,” thus its international use should 
be “sharply curtailed”). 
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tional legal system in other areas of the law.122  Because enforcing 
foreign anti-suit injunctions naturally flows into the idea of har-
monizing multiple international jurisdictions, the highly developed 
system of recognizing foreign provisional orders may serve as the 
first step in the U.S.-led evolution of the greater body of private in-
ternational law. 
5. CONCLUSION:  TOWARD A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
The U.S. legal system is sorely in need of a system to address 
foreign provisional orders in a coherent manner.  Constructing a 
system of recognizing and enforcing foreign provisional orders 
would serve the U.S. interests in several ways.  In addition to the 
inherent benefits that provisional orders provide to litigation, such 
a system would promote judicial economy and give rise to the 
U.S.-led private international law ecosystem.  Although such a sys-
tem may be created through any one of the judicial, legislative or
treaty-based paths, the treaty-based option would provide the
maximum flexibility necessary for this system to come to fruition.
122 See discussion supra text accompanying Section 3.4. 
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